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Abstract
Background: Donors often fund projects that develop innovative practices in low and middle-income countries,
hoping recipient governments will adopt and scale them within existing systems and programmes. Such
innovations frequently end when project funding ends, limiting longer term potential in countries with weak
health systems and pressing health needs. This paper aims to identify critical actions for externally funded project
implementers to enable scale-up of maternal and newborn child health innovations originally funded by the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (‘the foundation’), or influenced by innovations that were originally funded by the
foundation in three low-income settings: Ethiopia, the state of Uttar Pradesh in India and northeast Nigeria. We define
scale-up as the adoption of donor-funded innovations beyond their original project settings and time periods.
Methods: We conducted 71 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives from government, donors and
other development partner agencies, donor-funded implementers including frontline providers, research
organisations and professional associations. We explored three case study maternal and newborn innovations.
Selection criteria were: a) innovations originally funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (‘the foundation’),
or influenced by innovations that were originally funded by the foundation; b) innovations for which a decision
to scale-up had been made, allowing us to reflect on the factors influencing those decisions; c) innovations with
increased geographical reach, benefitting a greater number of people, beyond districts where foundation-funded
implementers were active. Our data were analysed based on a common analytic framework to aid cross-country
comparisons.
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Results: Based on study respondents’ accounts, we identified six critical steps that donor-funded implementers
had taken to enable the adoption of maternal and newborn health innovations at scale: designing innovations
for scale; generating evidence to influence and inform scale-up; harnessing the support of powerful individuals;
being prepared for scale-up and responsive to change; ensuring continuity by being part of the transition to
scale; and embracing the aid effectiveness principles of country ownership, alignment and harmonisation.
Conclusions: Six critical actions identified in this study were associated with adopting and scaling maternal and
newborn health innovations. However, scale-up is unpredictable and depends on factors outside implementers’
control.
Keywords: Northeast Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uttar Pradesh, India, Scale-up, Maternal and newborn health, Innovations
Background
The development sector is dominated by donor-funded
health projects and programmes implemented by non-
governmental organisations that aim to develop innova-
tive practices. It is hoped that these will be adopted by
low and middle-income governments and scaled within
existing health systems and programmes. Indeed,
scale-up of donor funded projects is an important aim: it
allows the geographical reach to be expanded to benefit
a larger number of people, as well as having longer term
benefits beyond time limited project periods. However,
as the quote in our title captures, such innovations com-
monly end when project funding stops, thereby limiting
any longer term and larger scale health impacts in coun-
tries with weak health systems and pressing health needs
[17, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30]. This paper’s aim is to identify the
critical actions for externally funded project implemen-
ters to enable scale-up, focussing on maternal and new-
born child health innovations in three low-income
settings.
The factors influencing whether innovative technologies
and practices are adopted and scaled-up are widely
reported in the literature. These include the attributes of
the innovation itself, such as its simplicity, appropriateness
for users and beneficiary communities, and whether it is
adaptable across different contexts. Potential adopters’ at-
titudes, needs, knowledge and skills affect their ability and
willingness to accept innovations, and policy champions
and community opinion leaders often influence the adop-
tion of innovations by government, health workers and
beneficiaries [3, 4, 10, 12, 14, 23–25, 27–30]. Aspects of
the contextual environments in countries where innova-
tions are introduced also have a bearing on whether
scale-up is possible or likely, including economic re-
sources and their distribution, policy leadership and prior-
ities, political ideologies and systems of governance,
macroeconomic policies, issues of conflict and security
and the absorptive capacity of health systems. Other fac-
tors include socioeconomic and cultural contexts such as
religious institutions and ideas, hierarchical gender rela-
tions, and prevailing health beliefs and practices [1, 3, 14,
15, 22, 24]. Some studies identify actions that enable
scale-up to happen including: implementers creating a
scale-up plan and designing innovations that are scalable
within the receiving environment; invoking the support of
policy champions and opinion leaders; generating and ef-
fectively communicating evidence; effectively advocating
government, while ensuring government’s close engage-
ment in the design and development of an innovation;
and increasing the capacity of the receiving organisation
to implement at scale [4, 7, 25, 27].
While there is an extensive literature on scale-up, few
studies use empirical evidence on the scale-up of innova-
tive practices and technologies in low and middle-income
countries. While some studies highlight actions that
enable scale-up, the most important actions are not
always identified. To address this gap, we conducted
a qualitative study focusing on three Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation-funded and scaled maternal and
newborn health innovations as in-depth case studies.
We defined maternal and newborn health innovations
as donor-funded interventions aiming to improve the sur-
vival of mothers and babies that are new to the contexts
that they are introduced and hence innovative, and
that strengthen existing health systems through improv-
ing healthcare accessibility or the performance of health
workers, and target poor, rural populations. We defined
scale-up as: the adoption and implementation of
donor-funded maternal and newborn health innovations,
thereby increasing their geographical reach to benefit a
greater number of people beyond donor-funded imple-
menters’ project districts or in the longer term beyond
donor-funded project periods.
The study was conducted in settings with some of the
world’s highest burdens of maternal and neonatal
mortality: Ethiopia, northeast Nigeria, and the state of
Uttar Pradesh in India. Table 1 provides basic maternal
and newborn health indicators for each setting. One
scaled innovation was selected from each setting for
in-depth study. This enabled us to address the aim of
this paper: to identify the critical actions adopted by
donor-funded implementers that enabled their maternal
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and newborn health innovations to be scaled by host
country governments. Despite the focus on maternal
and newborn health innovations, the list of critical
actions may be of value to implementers, donors and
other stakeholders in planning and developing health
innovations more generally in low- and middle-income
countries.
Methods
Case studies
We adopted a case study approach [31]. Our case
studies were Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation-funded
maternal and newborn health innovations that had been
scaled-up. Selection criteria were: a) they were originally
funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (‘the
foundation’), or influenced by innovations that were
originally funded by the foundation; b) the decision had
been made to scale up, allowing reflection on the factors
influencing those decisions; c) their geographical reach
was increased to benefit a greater number of people
beyond districts where foundation-funded implementers
were active. Based on these criteria we selected three
case studies from among all maternal and newborn
health innovations funded at the time by the foundation
in the study settings. We further distinguished between:
a) ‘government-led scale-up’, meaning country and state
governments deciding on, adopting, funding and leading
on the implementation of maternal and newborn health
innovations at scale while benefiting from support and
learning from donor-funded pilot innovations; and b)
‘donor-led scale-up’ meaning other donors deciding on,
adopting and funding donor-funded innovations at scale.
Our three case studies were:
Government-led scale-up
Sepsis case management in Ethiopia
An innovation allowing community health workers
(Health Extension Workers - HEWs) to administer anti-
biotics to newborn babies with bacterial infections where
referral to health facilities was not possible, in 19
districts, implemented by Save the Children USA with
foundation funding. The intended outcome was to
expand access to effective newborn sepsis case manage-
ment. The innovation was scaled as one of nine compo-
nents of the government-led flagship programme
Community Based Newborn Care, in 92 districts over a
first phase and implemented by a consortium of inter-
national nongovernmental organisations. The Ethiopian
Ministry of Health financed the programme with contri-
butions from multiple external donors.
mSehat in Uttar Pradesh, India
An innovation that involved supplying smart phones
with an application (app) for community health workers
(Accredited Social Health Activists - ASHAs and
Auxiliary Nurse Midwives) with features to facilitate
health communication, workflow checklists and a patient
registration system as part of a wider maternal and
newborn health data platform. The outcomes of the
innovation were expected to include more effective in-
teractions between ASHAs and communities. The
innovation was implemented between 2015 and 2017 by
a private provider as part of a public private partnership
in five of the 75 districts in Uttar Pradesh, with three
years of funding from a state government agency. It was
influenced by multiple small-scale (typically in one
district) ‘proof of concept’ mobile phone-related innova-
tions in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, funded by
external donors including the foundation. The innovation,
implemented as it was in five districts, was considered by
the Government of Uttar Pradesh to be an ‘expanded
pilot’ for potential scale-up across the state.
Donor-led scale-up
Emergency Transport Scheme (ETS) in Northeast Nigeria
An innovation to incentivise taxi drivers to transport
women to health facilities for childbirth implemented
across Gombe State by Society for Family Health, a
Nigerian nongovernmental organisation, and Transaid, a
UK-based nongovernmental organisation, with founda-
tion funding. The outcomes of the innovation were
expected to be improved accessibility to health facilities
among pregnant women. The innovation was scaled with
some modifications across the neighbouring Adamawa
State with three years of funding from the UK-based
charity Comic Relief, implemented by Transaid, with
support from Society for Family Health.
Research questions
The study focused on identifying the critical actions
that implementers had adopted to catalyse scale-up of
these three case study maternal and newborn health
innovations. Based on the scale-up literature (includ-
ing [4, 7, 24, 25, 27]) we explored the following
themes:
 How the case study innovations were designed to be
scalable;
Table 1 Maternal and newborn health indicators in Ethiopia,
Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh
Setting Maternal mortality rate
per 100,000 live births
Neonatal mortality rate
per 1000 live births
Year
Ethiopia 420 28 2015
Nigeria 560 34 2015
Uttar Pradesh 440 45 2011
Sources: [8]; [9]; [26]
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 Implementers’ actions to influence decisions to scale
those innovations, including whether and how
evidence was used to influence scale-up and the role
of key actors in shaping the decision;
 Ways implementers contributed to and supported
the implementation of the scaled innovations;
 Contextual factors influencing scale-up relating to
policy decision making and implementation at scale.
Data collection and analysis
A common topic guide was drafted to allow for direct
comparison across the three case studies and settings.
Researchers from Ethiopia, Nigeria, India and the UK
reviewed the guide and made adaptations to reflect
different country contexts. It was then used as the basis
of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the
field of maternal and newborn health, who were purpos-
ively selected for having detailed knowledge of the
scale-up of the case study innovations. We selected
semi-structured interviewing as our method of data col-
lection since this approach is appropriate for capturing
experiences, perspectives, practices and processes [6]. A
total of 72 interviews were conducted across the three
settings between March 2014 and December 2015. Our
respondents represented different constituencies: na-
tional and sub-national government, development
partners including donors and UN agencies, civil society
and private sector implementers of the case study inno-
vations, stakeholders from professional associations and
research organisations, as well as frontline implementers
delivering the innovations – namely HEWs, ASHAs and
taxi drivers (Table 2). This selection of allowed us to
capture a balance of views from the different constituen-
cies. The respondents included: managers and directors,
technical advisors, programme officers, and evaluation
officers and researchers. The interviews were conducted
by researchers with substantial experience of qualitative
methods. A deductive and inductive approach was taken;
we both examined a priori themes and were attentive to
and explored emerging themes in our interviews. Our
interviewing was consistent with widely accepted ap-
proaches to maintaining validity in qualitative methods,
including posing open questions rather than leading
questions, posing broader questions before more specific
probes, and as discussed below, we used triangulation
approaches to cross check our findings [19].
To preserve confidentiality, interviews took place in
private spaces, and all respondents gave informed
consent before each interview. We used digital sound
recorders for data capture where respondents agreed.
The data were analysed based on the framework ap-
proach [18]. Interviewers wrote up expanded field notes
shortly after each interview, based on sound recordings
and comprising detailed notes and direct quotes orga-
nised under analytic headings. These represented both a
priori and emerging themes, as suggested by [13].
Hence, by simultaneously capturing and analysing data
under thematic headings, we could identify emerging in-
terpretations and themes for exploration in subsequent
interviews. We then created a common analytic frame-
work enabling us to identify and compare common
themes across the three settings, as well as those that
were specific to individual case studies and contexts
[11]. Based on the analytic framework NS and DW
coded the expanded field notes. NS drafted the paper,
which was critically reviewed by all authors.
We adopted several methods to enhance the validity
of our findings [19]. We triangulated our data; stake-
holders were interviewed from multiple organisations
and we cross-verified their accounts enabling us to form
a balanced interpretation of the issues being explored.
An investigator triangulation approach was taken where
we compared and agreed different researchers’ analyses;
hence the findings presented in this paper are the inter-
pretation of multiple researchers. We also conducted
member checks by presenting and discussing emerging
findings with stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Lucknow,
London, Seattle and Vancouver. There was substantial
consistency between different stakeholder groups on the
issues we explored. Our results reflect the views from
the different stakeholder groups we interviewed: we
present common views across the full range of respon-
dents rather than a select few.
Results
Our respondents spoke about the importance of scaling
donor-financed innovations to maximise longer term
value from what were substantial donor investments, but
accepted that innovations were commonly not scaled
beyond their original project periods. Speaking about
Nigeria, a development partner lamented: ‘If a project
dies after funding, for me it is not a successful project…’;
while in India a government official exclaimed: ‘The
development sector is a graveyard of pilot projects!’ An
enduring problem reported by our respondents was that
short project periods of three to four years limited what
could be achieved, which could be wasteful and created
uncertainty for both implementers and governments.
Table 2 Interviews by type of organisation
Type of organisation Number of
interviews
Implementer organisations 40
Government 14
Development partners including donors and multilateral
organisations
11
Researchers, technical experts and members of
professional associations
7
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One government respondent in India captured this
point: ‘…any donor funds should be at least six or seven
years...because when you fund a four-year project…one
year goes on recruitment and then the last six months is
winding up…’. Nevertheless, as our three case studies
show, scale-up of innovations that are part of short-term
projects is possible. Based on our qualitative data we
identified six critical actions adopted by implementers
that were vital to the scale-up of one or more of our
three case study innovations. These were:
1. Designing innovations for scale;
2. Generating evidence to influence and inform
scale-up;
3. Harnessing the power of individuals;
4. Being prepared and responsive;
5. Ensuring continuity;
6. Embracing the principles of aid effectiveness.
The following sections explore each of these critical
actions in turn.
Designing innovations for scale
The first critical action reported by our respondents was
that scale-up had been integral to the design of our case
study innovations: ‘...if you plan scale-up when your
pilot’s over there are many things you can’t go back and
correct…’ a government respondent from India ex-
plained. Some stakeholders pointed out that despite this
happening, it was challenging to develop innovations
that were scalable; indeed, their experimental nature car-
ried the inherent risk that they would not be effective.
Hence, despite putting substantial energy into the
process of designing, testing and adapting innovations
for scale, externally funded innovations commonly fail.
A development partner reflected: ‘If you are lucky, that
process will generate some… innovations that can be
moved to scale...designing and testing and adapting only
spits out a sample of innovations that are truly scalable
if you are lucky...’. There were several common attributes
of the case study innovations that respondents described
as important to their scalability – these are listed as
follows.
Perceived as effective
Our respondents reported that it was vital that the case
innovations had been perceived as effective. In Ethiopia,
randomised control trial evidence suggested that the
sepsis case management innovation had impacted on
health outcomes, that justified its scale-up: ‘It was taken
because it produced results…,’ said an implementer. In
Uttar Pradesh, government and civil society respondents
noted that while evidence of quantitative impacts on
health outcomes was not generated, our respondents
reported that mSehat had demonstrably helped frontline
workers to fulfil their roles more effectively. Impact data
were also not available in Nigeria, however: ‘Because the
project has such a widespread history…it was kind of like
easy… to demonstrate effectiveness and impact,’ an imple-
menter suggested.
Required modest resource inputs
Respondents explained that the innovations required
financial resources that the government could afford and
modest human resource inputs; this was essential for
governments, with finite budgets and many competing
priorities, to consider them for scale. Modest financial
costs were important for ETS in Nigeria, where respon-
dents were clear that paying drivers would not work:
‘...the programme is fairly sustainable…because drivers
are giving up their time voluntarily’. mSehat was based
on a low-specification, relatively low-cost handset and
ASHA training was short; an implementer observed: ‘…
it’s feasible to train them on this and it doesn’t take an
entire lifetime to learn...’. Similarly, sepsis case manage-
ment in Ethiopia was based on a short training period,
which respondents explained was a very important
aspect of its scalability. However, it had been difficult
for implementers to balance committing substantial
effort and resources to ensure the success of their
innovations, with creating innovations that were not
resource-intensive, and therefore scalable with limited
government budgets. A government official in Uttar
Pradesh summarised: ‘…at limited scale you can do
anything – but we deliberately avoided doing such
things that’ll not be possible to scale-up...’.
Acceptable to and incentivised frontline workers
Respondents pointed to the ways the innovations were
considered acceptable to frontline workers and thereby
incentivised their adoption. In Uttar Pradesh, mSehat’s
user interface was designed to be easily understood by
ASHAs, as one implementer explained: ‘…even those
that have minimum qualifications will face no problem
in adequately using the application once they get used to
it through our training programmes’. ASHAs would also
receive material incentives; entering data electronically
meant faster performance-based payments than the
former paper-based system, and the innovation reduced
their workloads: their tasks such as counselling could
be performed more quickly and meant they no longer
carried heavy logbooks and other materials. Similarly,
in Nigeria, the innovation incentivised taxi drivers
involved in the scheme by allowing them to park
their vehicles at the front of passenger loading
queues, although it was accepted that this had been
less effective in remoter areas with few taxis. In the
three settings, goodwill and satisfaction incentivised
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frontline workers. Our respondents explained that in
Ethiopia HEWs gained satisfaction by saving babies
lives, which increased their acceptance and credibility
within the community. Likewise, the innovation gave
ASHAs in Uttar Pradesh more confidence to work
among communities, and in northeast Nigeria
branded tee shirts, caps and car stickers engendered
feelings of pride and commitment. ‘We believe that
God Almighty is going to reward all of us; that’s why
many of us will not even collect money,’ said a driver.
The ETS scheme had improved drivers’ standing
among communities; a driver revealed: ‘…people see
us as useless, good-for-nothing rascals…this pro-
gramme’s an opportunity for us to change that
image…’. The smart phone innovation in Uttar
Pradesh was also described as aspirational, and as
having novelty value: an implementer said: ‘…of course
the novelty factor. Hey! We are doing something new
and get a smartphone…’.
Acceptable to communities
The innovations met communities’ needs, were cultur-
ally acceptable and aligned with local cultural and trad-
itional practices. Capturing this point, an implementer
in Ethiopia remarked: ‘The community has to accept it
and say, “this is actually something that can solve my
problems”’, while in Nigeria a professional association
representative said: ‘If the community does not accept
you then there is no way you will be able to scale-up’.
Ascertaining innovation acceptability depended on con-
ducting formative research with community leaders, and
the innovations were designed accordingly; for example,
our respondents reported that the use of locally relevant
visual and audio material for the mobile phone app in
Uttar Pradesh was very important to its acceptance by
communities.
Adaptable across diverse geographical contexts
The innovations were described by our respondents as
being adaptable across diverse sociocultural contexts
and to variations in the strength of the health system
between different areas; an implementer summed up:
‘We keep saying it’s not one size fits all – in a country
like Ethiopia we have to have different approaches and
strategies in different areas’. Nevertheless, many features
of the three innovations were also standardised, which
made them cost effective at scale: ‘There might be some
innovative variations…but in terms of...training, supervi-
sion, it’s all quite standardised’, clarified a development
partner in Ethiopia. Similarly, in Nigeria, while there was
flexibility to adapt to diverse geographical settings, ‘…the
principles of the scheme have to remain the same...’, one
implementer explained.
Generating evidence to influence and inform scale-up
A second critical action relates to evidence. In the three
settings, our respondents reported that quantitative sur-
vey data establishing an innovation’s impacts on health
outcomes, while important, had not been a critical part
of decisions to scale innovations. Instead, first-hand,
experiential evidence fostered emotional buy-in from
government and other decision makers and influenced
decisions to scale innovations. In addition, qualitative
evidence documenting implementation processes, to-
gether with syntheses of secondary data, showed which
innovations were feasible in practice and offered lessons
about how they could be implemented at scale.
In Ethiopia, quantitative evidence of impacts on health
outcomes generated by the implementer and periodically
shared with the government had been necessary. How-
ever, this evidence had helped justify, rather than trigger,
the decision, which was made before the end-line quan-
titative survey results were released. A development
partner explained: ‘The policy breakthrough is never the
data, the findings themselves...it’s the trust, the relevance,
it’s being at the table, being able to show you support im-
plementation...’. Indeed, first-hand evidence in the form
of project visits was considered very influential: ‘We took
[government decision makers] out, we showed them…that
was very convincing to them...’, said an implementer in
Ethiopia. Evidence of impacts did not influence the fun-
der’s decision to scale ETS in Nigeria. Indeed, it had
been difficult to collect such evidence because drivers
were often unwilling to keep activity records, and some
were illiterate. An implementer explained: ‘The driver’s
responsibility is to get the woman to the health facility
and often they go beyond the call of duty…when it comes
to us pestering them for data sometimes they don’t see it
as a priority’. Instead, the project’s plausibility compen-
sated for the lack of data; a researcher said: ‘…who can
resist saving mothers and babies’ lives? It’s a fantastically
plausible project…’. Similarly, in Uttar Pradesh, evidence
of health impacts did not influence the decision to fi-
nance mSehat. Instead, it was inspired by the fact that
externally funded implementers had demonstrated that
mobile phone-based innovations were implementable in
India. An implementer reflected: ‘My experience in
[Uttar Pradesh] has been more than the data, more than
the impact [it’s about]…what’s happening in the
field...they want to have a taste of it...’
Respondents in the three settings reported that imple-
menters had collected qualitative evidence documenting
implementation experiences and challenges, and that
this evidence had been important in helping to scale the
innovations effectively. In Ethiopia, such evidence
showed the best ways to train HEWs to identify danger
signs and administer antibiotics to sick babies, demon-
strated that they could correctly refer more complex
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cases and that communities accepted this. While gener-
ating ‘local’ qualitative evidence was considered by our
respondents to be vital, the implementer also synthe-
sised evidence from other countries. This engendered
acceptance by Ethiopia’s government and helped design
the scaled innovation: ‘Save the Children’s role was…in
bringing out other countries’ evidence and…making sure
we have included the key interventions and followed
already tested and feasible strategies,’ explained an
implementer.
In Uttar Pradesh, mSehat adopted lessons from the
multiple donor-funded pilot projects: ‘[mSehat tried to]
absorb what was there in the field...all of these [pilot in-
novations] shaped it…,’ a development partner reflected.
In Nigeria, lessons learned from implementing the
innovation in Gombe State, including ways to increase
driver retention, were important in informing the devel-
opment of the innovation in Adamawa State. A develop-
ment partner said: ‘…between all those different pieces of
learning, even if they weren’t externally validated…some
learning had been done’.
Harnessing the power of individuals
A third critical action to catalyse scale-up was imple-
menters mobilising the support of policy champions per-
ceived to have power, connections and influence at high
levels from government and development partner agen-
cies as well as traditional rulers, who could convince
others that an innovation should be scaled. In the three
settings, personal connections with government decision
makers were described as being as, if not more, import-
ant than formally engaging government: ‘Having some
experience of working in Nigeria it’s very important to
engage on the personal level...,’ said an implementer.
However, while building and maintaining relationships
with powerful individuals had been vital, respondents
acknowledged that with so much depending on this
approach there was a risk that if that person left they
would need to elicit support afresh.
In Uttar Pradesh, there was strong interest among key
senior state government officials in using digital technol-
ogy to address health needs in rural areas, including the
Chief Minister, ‘…who very much believed that technology
was the solution to many of the problems in administra-
tion…that was a major factor which paved the way for
scale-up’, according to a government official. One
particular government champion was reported as critical,
as an implementer clarified: ‘…because he’s a renowned
policymaker his words are looked up to with respect, so
that helped us a lot. If you ask me any single thing…I think
it’s [this person’s] vision and passion and belief - one [per-
son] can make a difference!’ Similarly, in Ethiopia, a senior
health official’s support was crucial to government agree-
ing to scale the innovation: ‘Convincing him, identifying
him as a champion...that was very, very decisive’, an imple-
menter explained. While in Nigeria the innovation was
not scaled with government funding, seeking the accept-
ance and endorsement of senior government officials
within Adamawa State was an essential part of introducing
the innovation there; an implementer summarised: ‘The
state [Commissioner for] Health was quite pivotal in
allowing the programme to progress further’.
In Ethiopia, individuals from development agencies
also contributed to the decision to scale the innovation;
‘What was the magic in Ethiopia? It does come down to
some of the personalities!’ said a development partner,
who also exclaimed that the commitment and belief of
one individual had been vital: ‘[This person]…had a
really good relationship with the Ministry of Health...and
was a really proactive person. [Their] personality was
definitely a factor...’. In Nigeria, traditional rulers were
influential. Although some rulers were supportive of the
introduction of innovations, many rulers embracing con-
servative views had resisted externally funded health
programmes, as was the case in Adamawa State. Hence,
the implementer had not engaged them there.
Being prepared and responsive
A fourth critical action was implementers both ensuring
that scale-up was integral to their project plans and be-
ing responsive to change. The former involved conduct-
ing formative research to assess policy, health systems,
geographical and sociocultural contexts to help to design
innovations that were culturally appropriate and aligned
with country health policies, programmes and targets. A
development partner speaking about Nigeria sum-
marised: ‘For scale-up to occur successfully we cannot
rely on luck… if we go to the field without a prepared
agenda, we’ve set ourselves up for failure’. Formative re-
search also formed the basis of implementers’ advocacy
plans, including identifying which actors they could
work with and those they needed to petition for support.
In Nigeria, formative research was important to ascer-
tain which districts were sufficiently safe to implement
the innovation in the context of the security situation.
While preparing for and anticipating scale-up had
been important, policy contexts were not static in the
three settings; changes in government administrations
following elections in Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh inevit-
ably led to changes in policy direction. As our respon-
dents pointed out, implementers had to be responsive to
change over the course of their project’s lifespan to
remain relevant. A development partner in India ex-
plained: ‘Flexibility is key to go apace with government;
anything that you work on, you have to keep their strug-
gles, timelines, and accordingly adjust yours. You have to
be patient for this’. In Ethiopia too, respondents stressed
that health policy ideas changed quite often and hence it
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was important it was for donors and implementers to be
responsive to the government’s thinking; an implementer
said: ‘Knowing when to push your agenda and when to
back off is really important’. Civil society implementers,
in particular, needed to ensure they worked around the
Ethiopian government’s agenda: ‘[It’s] the tricky role non-
governmental organisations have to balance in Ethiopia,’
one development partner revealed. Respondents sug-
gested that a policy window emerged in Ethiopia created
by three factors: increased political support following a
study visit to Nepal, which demonstrated that
community-based sepsis case management was feasible;
the release of national figures showing limited improve-
ments in neonatal and maternal mortality; and increased
government confidence that its Health Extension
Program was sufficiently robust to support additional
innovations. An implementer explained: ‘[Events came
together] in a certain pivotal moment where the Min-
istry decided there’s going to be a policy shift...’ The
implementer responded to this 'pivotal moment', as a
development partner reflected: ‘They were flexible
and nimble...recognising hey, there’s an opportunity
here!’
Ensuring continuity in the transition to scale
The fifth critical action to catalyse scale-up was the
importance of continuity of implementers’ involvement
in implementing the scaled innovations rather than, as is
common among many projects, their involvement
stopping when project funding ran out. Across our three
case studies, the externally funded implementers con-
tributed to delivering the scaled innovations. Transaid
acted as lead implementer in the scale-up State of
Adamawa; Save the Children was part of an implement-
ing consortium for the Community-Based Newborn
Care programme in Ethiopia; and in Uttar Pradesh,
Intrahealth, the implementer of a foundation-funded
project, became part of the public private partnership
implementing mSehat. Our respondents suggested that
it was particularly important to harness the experience
of project staff within the scaled programme; an imple-
menter in Uttar Pradesh captured: ‘Who else in that con-
sortium has any on the ground experience of these
things? So obviously [the implementer] brings a lot of
that to the consortium…’ An implementer in Nigeria
summarised the value of harnessing experience and pro-
ject materials within the scaled programme: ‘If you want
to scale [the innovation], what are the lessons learned in
the pilot…? What mistakes have we made, what chal-
lenges have we faced…? That initial pilot helped to serve
as a guide’.
In Ethiopia, study respondents reported that Save the
Children had participated in workshops to develop and
design the scaled innovation, including helping to
draft implementation plans and guidelines, which also
enabled them to influence government thinking. ‘...We
used that as an opportunity to integrate as many
newborn-care-related activities as possible in that
implementation plan...,’ an implementer remarked.
Helping to build the capacity of Ethiopian regional
government staff and systems was also an important
step to enabling the Government to implement the
innovation at scale. An implementer said: ‘The
[health] system may not be ready. So, when you go for
scale-up you have to put into your programme other
components to strengthen the health system...’
Embracing aid effectiveness principles
The sixth critical action pointed to by our respondents
was that the externally funded implementers had
embraced the aid effectiveness principles of country own-
ership, whereby the government took ownership of the
innovation; alignment, meaning externally funded innova-
tions fitted closely with country programmes, priorities
and targets; and harmonisation, that is, coordination
among donors and externally funded implementers.
Country ownership
In Ethiopia and Uttar Pradesh, it was critical that gov-
ernment owned the innovations rather than them being
presented as donor projects. The Ethiopian government
expected donors and their implementers to support
country policies and therefore there was considerable in-
volvement and consultation by the government in the
development of the sepsis case management innovation;
one implementer summed up: ‘Government is always in
the driving seat’, while another implementer revealed:
If you see how things work in Ethiopia, [development
partner] staff almost work for the government. They sup-
port the Ministry at all levels…they don’t just sit in their
offices and work on their own projects. They are mindful
that they are supporting the national health system….
Similarly, mSehat was presented as state government-led
and owned rather than introduced by donors, al-
though government respondents acknowledged that
externally funded pilot innovations had encouraged
the state government to finance mSehat, and that
design features and learning from pilot projects had
fed into the innovation’s design through extensive
consultation between the state government and the
implementers of the pilot projects. A development
partner explained: ‘[The donor]…took a very small,
critically important role – the triggering role. But now
it’s government’s baby…’, while a government official
clarified: ‘Funding is from [government]…The intellec-
tual property will be 100% owned by [government];
that’s something we really care about’. Hence, in both
settings, externally funded implementers closely
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engaged with government from inception and through
the project’s life. In contrast, government ownership
of ETS was limited, reflecting the fact that it was
scaled in Adamawa state with donor, rather than gov-
ernment, funding. Indeed, our respondents explained
that rural health programmes in northeast Nigeria
were commonly donor financed, with state govern-
ments adopting a limited role in leading and coordin-
ating externally funded programmes. Nevertheless,
Transaid did closely engage with government actors
to introduce the innovation: ‘…government officials
were really happy about the programme because they
said that they are ever ready to assist us if we need
their help…,’ according to an implementer. Relation-
ship building was therefore critical in the three set-
tings; as suggested earlier, the support of individuals
was vitally important. Thus, country ownership meant
influential individuals in government having strong
ownership of the innovations. In Ethiopia, an imple-
menter remarked: ‘…ongoing informing and engage-
ment was key for the government to really go ahead
with the start of scale-up’.
Alignment
Respondents across three settings agreed that our case
study innovations closely fitted with country priorities,
programmes and targets. While Ethiopia received sub-
stantial development assistance for health, aligning with
government programmes was critical for donors and
their implementers. Respondents agreed that the sepsis
case management innovation closely corresponded with
country health programmes and was acknowledged as
helping to achieve the government’s under-five mortality
targets; hence government agreed to its scale-up. One
implementer explained: ‘…it addresses a major health
problem and that problem is a government priority, so it
aligns with that. [And] it builds on the system; it isn’t a
parallel system’. In Uttar Pradesh, reductions in donor
budgets meant their roles were changing from funding
agencies, with some influence on government, to provid-
ing technical assistance in support of government initia-
tives. An implementer said: ‘…it’s clearly not donors who
are calling the shots here. They have to align with what
the government wants.’ Hence, to influence the develop-
ment of mSehat, pilot project implementers closely
aligned their work with state government priorities.
While in Nigeria the government did not finance the
innovation at scale, the implementers did need to
present the innovation as fitting with the Adamawa state
government’s goals. As a development partner pointed
out, the importance of presenting the work using the
right terms helped align it with government thinking: ‘If
we look at it as just ETS, then it doesn’t align with
anything; if you call it [maternal and newborn child
health] then it aligns with everything’.
Harmonisation
Harmonisation was also an important factor that
contributed to scale-up. In Ethiopia, harmonisation was
improving, largely due to the government taking a
strong coordination role through the government-led
National Child Survival Technical Working Group. An
implementer observed: ‘The Technical Working Group
was one voice, not a single organisation or individual
voice… it was able to leverage, at least within that group,
a consensus.’ Engaging with this group had been import-
ant to government’s adoption of sepsis case manage-
ment; it gave Save the Children a legitimate channel to
communicate with government and importantly, to
demonstrate its willingness to harmonise its efforts with
other actors. In Uttar Pradesh and Nigeria, however,
harmonisation was problematic. A government official
in India outlined the reality: ‘Everybody will talk of…not
working in silos and all that. But… if there are two differ-
ent donors and there are two projects in the same area
they will not share any information…’ Limited harmon-
isation meant implementers could not benefit from what
was learned by others, and poorly coordinated commu-
nication with government, and indeed competition for
government attention, made decision-making relating to
scale-up difficult. A development partner acknowledged
that coordination at the federal level in Nigeria was im-
proving, although not so at state and district levels:
When we sit over tea or coffee we say “yes”, and when
we go back to our organisation we do our own things…we
come with money and expertise and we confuse them
with conflicting information…we disempower government
and make them feel like puppets; we need to give them
permission to be in charge because they are in charge,
and we need to give them that power and support them.
Discussion
We identified six critical actions that donor-funded
implementers adopted to foster scale-up: each action
was critical to the scale-up of at least one of the case
study innovations we explored:
1. They designed innovations for scale;
2. They generated a strong base of evidence to
influence and inform scale-up;
3. They harnessed the support of powerful individuals;
4. They prepared for scale-up and were responsive to
change;
5. They ensured continuity by being part of the
transition to scale process;
6. They embraced the aid effectiveness principles of
country ownership, alignment and harmonisation.
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Most of these critical actions were common across our
case studies, although there were differences reflecting
very different country contexts. While each innovation
was different, they shared several design attributes that
promoted their scalability. They were perceived as effect-
ive, they were relatively simple and required modest re-
source inputs, they incentivised frontline workers to use
them, they were acceptable and reflected cultural and
traditional practices within the communities into which
they were introduced (a point also made by [16]), and
they were adaptable across diverse geographical con-
texts. Also in common was that quantitative evidence of
impacts had not substantially influenced decisions to
scale each of the case study innovations. Instead, other
forms of evidence were important including qualitative
evidence, secondary data and first hand experiential evi-
dence. Having the support of powerful individuals had
been critical to the scale-up of the three innovations:
government officials in all settings, individuals from de-
velopment agencies in Ethiopia and traditional rulers in
northeast Nigeria. The fact that the implementers had
prepared for scale-up was also important, as was their
responsiveness to changes in country priorities and pro-
grammes, especially in Ethiopia where the implementer
waited for a ‘pivotal moment’ to promote the innovation
vocally. Also in common across the settings, the imple-
menters each contributed to the implementation of in-
novations when they were being transitioned to scale,
and in Ethiopia the implementer used their experience
to help shape wider government strategy. The principles
of aid effectiveness were presented by our respondents
as important factors promoting scale-up. In all settings,
our case study innovations closely aligned with country
priorities, programmes and targets. Harmonisation
among donors, development agencies and implementers
was also significant, although it was only in Ethiopia
where strong government coordination appeared to have
contributed to the scale-up of the sepsis case manage-
ment innovation. The governments of Ethiopia and
Uttar Pradesh committed finances to scaling innovations
and led on their implementation at scale; hence country
ownership was critical in those places. These contrast
with Nigeria, where despite efforts to advocate for
government funding, the scaled innovation was imple-
mented by a UK-based nongovernmental organisation
based on a grant from a UK charity.
The existing scale-up literature points to the import-
ance of designing innovations that are effective and
scalable, the role of policy champions and the need to
prepare for scale-up (for example, [4, 7, 25, 27]). Our
study contributes a number of insights to the existing
literature on scale-up. Our data show that these factors
were also very important in three low-income settings
with high burdens of maternal and neonatal mortality.
Additionally, as our list of six actions highlights,
scale-up depended on many factors in addition to the in-
novations being perceived as effective. A certain ‘magic’
was required consisting of good luck as well as having
the support of powerful individuals, which was consid-
ered more important than formal decision making by or-
ganisations. It was also important that the implementers
were able to respond when political and policy environ-
ments were favourable, as was the willingness of mul-
tiple donors and implementers to harmonise and align
their activities, and the strong ownership of recipient
governments, especially in Ethiopia. An important con-
tribution of our study is that it highlights that while ex-
ternally funded implementers can take steps to enable
scale-up, scale-up can be unpredictable and dependent
on many factors outside their control. Indeed, many in-
novations that are effective do not get scaled up; and
while ineffective projects also do not get scaled-up,
those with limited evidence of their effectiveness can be
scaled, which was the case with our three example
innovations [24, 25].
Another contribution of our study to existing litera-
ture on scale-up is that it focusses on project-based
innovations. It seems likely that scale-up will remain dif-
ficult given the continued focus on short-term,
project-based donor financing for nongovernmental
organisations to implement pieces of work often falling
outside country health strategies and programmes, bud-
geting cycles and monitoring and reporting systems [5,
21]. This mode of donor support has inevitably resulted
in a multiplicity of parallel projects in Ethiopia, Uttar
Pradesh and northeast Nigeria where many donors,
other development partners and implementers working
on health-related activities make harmonisation challen-
ging. Harmonisation is often against implementers’ in-
terests because they compete for donor funding and
need to demonstrate to donors that impacts are attribut-
able to their efforts. Poor harmonisation is problematic
for governments with limited capacity to coordinate
multiple externally funded activities, therefore making it
difficult to make informed decisions about scale-up of
donor-funded innovations. Project-based financing is
also the embodiment of unpredictable aid – predictabil-
ity being another widely recognised aid effectiveness
principle [21]. Limited longer term predictability of
funding heightens competition among implementers for
short-term grants, which in turn undermines efforts at
harmonisation [21, 25]. Short-term funding also limits
what implementers can achieve, particularly when they
aim to change ingrained cultural and traditional prac-
tices [2, 16]. Limited predictability is problematic for
governments; it is difficult to forecast whether, when
and how much funding donors will commit to standa-
lone projects and hence whether and to what extent
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such projects might contribute to country targets and fit
into long term strategic plans. Hence, recipient govern-
ments struggle to commit to funding and scaling exter-
nally funded innovations in the longer term. Yet, one
justification for project-based working is that innova-
tive ways of working can be tested. Donors, therefore,
need to reflect on whether they can accept the prob-
ability that even projects deemed successful com-
monly end when project funding ends. While this
approach – in the words of one of our respondents
‘…spits out a sample of innovations that are truly
scalable if you are lucky...,’ it might be argued this is
an inefficient way of addressing pressing maternal and
newborn and other health needs in low and
middle-income countries.
Our study focussed on implementers’ actions to enable
scale-up. Donors can also foster innovation scale-up.
They can allow their implementers flexibility to respond
to change, which contributed to the scale-up of sepsis
case management in Ethiopia. Donors could support
their implementers technically and financially to gener-
ate strong evidence to assist governments in deciding
which innovations to scale and how to implement them
at scale. There would also be considerable value in
donors extending funding to implementers through the
transition to scale period, thereby enabling them to
support governments scale innovations. Donors could
also increase the prospects of scale-up through embra-
cing the principles of aid effectiveness. A key approach
to achieving this is to ensure they embrace
government-led donor coordination mechanisms, and
that they require their implementers do so. This is likely
to strengthen country ownership, alignment and har-
monisation, which were particularly absent in Nigeria,
thereby avoiding situations where donors prescribe
country health programmes that ‘disempower govern-
ment and make them feel like puppets’, as one of our
respondents explained. Rather than simply acting as
funding bodies, donor programme officers’ direct in-
volvement in fostering harmonisation among multiple
implementers, and brokering relationships with govern-
ment can also be valuable, which was an approach
adopted by the foundation in Ethiopia.
Additionally, recipient governments can take steps to
increase the value of externally funded programmes; it is
not in their interests for donors to fund short-term pro-
jects in their countries with limited prospects of being
scaled. Taking ownership of donor-funded innovations
and working closely with implementers and donors is
likely to help maximise alignment with country prior-
ities, programmes and targets; these were important
factors leading to the scale-up of our examples of
‘government-led scale-up’ in Ethiopia and Uttar Pradesh.
Indeed, in these settings, with high levels of government
ownership, it seems far more likely that donor-funded
innovations will be sustained within country health sys-
tems in the longer term, in contrast with our example of
‘donor-led scale-up’ in northeast Nigeria. Governments
could also strengthen coordination mechanisms to foster
information exchange among partners, to help capture
and make sense of evidence on innovations to aid deci-
sion making around which innovations to scale-up, and
to enable government to inform partners of its current
and emerging country priorities, programmes and tar-
gets to help ensure donor-funded innovations are
aligned. Again, it was in Ethiopia where respondents re-
ported this as happening.
This study has a number of limitations. While we
provide only a snapshot of the relatively early stages of
scale-up of our three case study innovations and were
not able to track their longer term progress, our inter-
views were conducted after the point in time that these
innovations had been adopted at scale. Hence our ana-
lysis was able to capture the decision-making process
leading to their scale-up. A follow-up study is exploring
the longer term sustainability of these and other mater-
nal and newborn health innovations in the three settings.
Our focus was on successfully scaled innovations; it was
beyond the scope of the paper to explore the factors in-
fluencing why innovations are not scaled. It was also be-
yond the scope of the study to quantitatively measure
the relative importance of the critical actions identified;
our findings do, however, suggest that each action was
critical to the scale-up of least one of the case study in-
novations. We have also simplified highly complex,
changing contexts and focussed in detail on only three
examples from maternal and newborn health supported
by one specific donor. While it is difficult to ascertain
how generalisable our findings are to other health inno-
vations and to other settings, it is hoped that the insights
presented in this paper will be relevant to other donors
and in other settings where project-based funding is
common. As the focus of the paper is on why innova-
tions were scaled rather than the experiences of the end
users, our data collection drew out the perspectives of
decision makers from government, development partner
agencies, implementers and frontline workers, but not
those of beneficiary communities, who might have views
that contrast with those we present in this paper.
Conclusions
This paper highlights the difficulties of scaling-up
project-based donor-funded innovations; the project-based
approach tends to imply short-term and often unpredict-
able funding and leads to limited coordination among
multiple actors – factors that undermine efforts to pro-
mote scale-up. The paper also shows that while scale-up of
donor-funded maternal and newborn health innovations
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can be difficult, there are approaches that implementers
can adopt to increase the prospects of scale-up. The first
two were: designing innovations for scale, by ensuring they
were effective, simple and acceptable to communities, that
they incentivised frontline workers to use them and were
adaptable across diverse contexts; and generating a strong
base of evidence to influence and inform scale-up includ-
ing qualitative operational lessons and experiential
evidence as well as quantitative impacts data. The other ac-
tions were, harnessing the support of powerful individuals;
being both prepared for scale-up and responsive to change;
ensuring continuity by being part of the transition to scale
process; and embracing the aid effectiveness principles of
country ownership, alignment and harmonisation. Donors
can increase the prospects of scale-up by supporting their
implementers to build strong evidence, allowing their
implementers flexibility to respond to policy changes,
supporting their implementers in the transition to scale
process, being active in fostering country ownership, align-
ment and harmonisation, and increasing the length of time
they are prepared to fund projects. Governments can in-
crease the value of externally funded innovations by taking
ownership of those innovations, engaging with implemen-
ters and donors to help maximise the alignment of innova-
tions with country priorities, programmes and targets and
strengthening donor coordination mechanisms to foster
better harmonisation among multiple externally funded
projects.
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